Failure Pattern
Each multi cloud provider manages identity differently. Attackers exploit inconsistent trust boundaries across platforms.
What We See in the Field
A workload compromised in one cloud uses federated or inherited credentials to access resources in another. Multi cloud trust allows attackers to pivot across regions and vendors.
Underlying Causes
Cloud-specific IAM implementations
No unified device identity
Metadata drift between clouds
Overprivileged federation tokens
Blind trust across hybrid networks
Trust-Native Network Resolution
DTL creates a universal identity layer that spans clouds and on-premise systems. Sessions cannot occur between clouds unless both workloads present verified TrustKeys.
Broken Trust Assumption
This failure pattern has played out repeatedly in real security incidents—not because of missing tools, but because of how trust is assigned.
In breaches such as SolarWinds, Capital One, Okta, and MOVEit, attackers did not bypass security controls. They operated through them, using valid identities, trusted credentials, signed code, and encrypted sessions. Security systems accepted these signals as proof of legitimacy, allowing malicious behavior to proceed.
The common thread across these incidents is structural: identity was assumed based on trust signals, not proven at the moment of execution.