Failure Pattern
Encryption alone protects data in transit but does not verify the identity of the systems communicating. Attackers leverage encrypted channels to hide malicious behavior.
What We See in the Field
A compromised workload sends encrypted traffic that appears legitimate. Monitoring tools see valid TLS sessions. Attackers operate inside opaque encrypted flows without resistance.
Underlying Causes
Encryption without identity verification
TLS certificates not bound to devices
Encrypted east-west traffic not inspected
Shared ports and protocols
Blind trust in encryption as a security guarantee
Trust-Native Network Resolution
DTL binds cryptographic identity to encrypted sessions. Traffic is both encrypted and tied to a verified TrustKey. Attackers cannot leverage encryption alone to masquerade as trusted workloads.
Broken Trust Assumption
This failure pattern has played out repeatedly in real security incidents—not because of missing tools, but because of how trust is assigned.
In breaches such as SolarWinds, Capital One, Okta, and MOVEit, attackers did not bypass security controls. They operated through them, using valid identities, trusted credentials, signed code, and encrypted sessions. Security systems accepted these signals as proof of legitimacy, allowing malicious behavior to proceed.
The common thread across these incidents is structural: identity was assumed based on trust signals, not proven at the moment of execution.