Failure Pattern: Endpoint Agents
Endpoint agents enforce policies but do not provide cryptographic identity for the device or workload. Attackers exploit this gap to impersonate trusted systems.
What We See in the Field
Compromised endpoint agents with a valid agent installed continues to communicate as if it were trusted. Agents register the device as compliant even when attackers control the operating environment.
Underlying Causes
– Identity depends on metadata
– Agents validate posture but not origin
– No hardware-bound trust score
– Certificates cloned between devices
– Policies assume authenticated means trusted
Trust-Native Network Resolution
DTL assigns each workload a cryptographic TrustKey tied to its fingerprint. Agents cannot impersonate trusted workloads. Every session must originate from a verified identity before traffic is allowed.
Broken Trust Assumption
This failure pattern has played out repeatedly in real security incidents—not because of missing tools, but because of how trust is assigned.
In breaches such as SolarWinds, Capital One, Okta, and MOVEit, attackers did not bypass security controls. They operated through them, using valid identities, trusted credentials, signed code, and encrypted sessions. Security systems accepted these signals as proof of legitimacy, allowing malicious behavior to proceed.
The common thread across these incidents is structural: identity was assumed based on trust signals, not proven at the moment of execution.