Failure Pattern
Event pipelines aggregate logs and telemetry from multiple workloads but do not verify the identity of the systems sending them. Attackers exploit this to poison attribution.
What We See in the Field
A compromised workload forwards logs under the identity of a legitimate service. Monitoring systems accept false metadata. Investigations are misled by corrupted telemetry.
Underlying Causes
Event streams based on trust
Metadata spoofing
Shared logging credentials
No source-of-truth identity
Distributed pipelines lacking workload validation
Trust-Native Network Resolution
DTL embeds immutable cryptographic identity into each session. Event pipelines receive verifiable identity, preventing spoofed telemetry or false attribution.
Broken Trust Assumption
This failure pattern has played out repeatedly in real security incidents—not because of missing tools, but because of how trust is assigned.
In breaches such as SolarWinds, Capital One, Okta, and MOVEit, attackers did not bypass security controls. They operated through them, using valid identities, trusted credentials, signed code, and encrypted sessions. Security systems accepted these signals as proof of legitimacy, allowing malicious behavior to proceed.
The common thread across these incidents is structural: identity was assumed based on trust signals, not proven at the moment of execution.