Failure Pattern
Server patching removes vulnerabilities but does not close identity gaps. Attackers bypass patched systems by impersonating trusted workloads.
What We See in the Field
A fully patched system accepts malicious requests because the attacker uses valid stolen credentials. Server patching does nothing to stop trusted impersonation.
Underlying Causes
Identity not tied to patching
Shared service accounts
Certificate reuse
Blind acceptance of internal traffic
Patching focuses on software, not identity
Trust-Native Network Resolution
DTL prohibits session creation without identity verification. Even patched systems cannot be impersonated because trust requires verified TrustKeys.
Broken Trust Assumption
The attacks that exposed this failure pattern were not stealthy break-ins. They were trusted operations.
During incidents such as SolarWinds, Capital One, and Okta, malicious activity was carried out using valid identities and approved execution paths. Certificates were valid. Tokens were accepted. Sessions were authenticated. From the system’s point of view, nothing appeared wrong.
This is the risk of trust inferred from credentials, location, or prior authentication.