Storage Clusters Accept Malicious Clients

Dec 22, 2025

Failure Pattern

Storage clusters validate API keys or certificates but not workload identity. Attackers compromise trusted clients to read or corrupt data.

 

What We See in the Field

A compromised VM uses valid storage credentials to read sensitive data or issue destructive writes. Storage nodes trust the requests because authentication passes.

 

Underlying Causes

Certificates reused
Overprivileged storage API roles
Static trust in internal networks
Lack of session identity validation
Blind acceptance of authenticated clients

 

Trust-Native Network Resolution

DTL enforces workload identity before any storage request is accepted. Only workloads with valid TrustKeys can interact with storage nodes.

 

Broken Trust Assumption

This failure pattern has played out repeatedly in real security incidents—not because of missing tools, but because of how trust is assigned.

In breaches such as SolarWinds, Capital One, Okta, and MOVEit, attackers did not bypass security controls. They operated through them, using valid identities, trusted credentials, signed code, and encrypted sessions. Security systems accepted these signals as proof of legitimacy, allowing malicious behavior to proceed.

The common thread across these incidents is structural: identity was assumed based on trust signals, not proven at the moment of execution.